2 against exclusions and discriminations are defined and put to work constitute the touchstone of democracy in a world in which self-sufficient nationality has disappeared." 1 Xenophobia is, literally, a fear of foreigners. Xenophobes are considered to be those people who harbor negative attitudes to foreigners, motivated in large part by a fear of them. An extensive literature studying the psychological basis of xenophobia has pointed to how external threats increase group solidarity and ethnocentrism while, as a corollary, promoting intolerance and closemindedness. 2 A pioneering study of the EU explained the dynamics of xenophobia: "Foreigners are seen as carriers of a different culture with the potential to threaten the integrity of one's own nation. The assumption that the nation embodies culture comes from a belief that the nation is the arena in which critical values and beliefs are transmitted to developing members. Since each culture consists of a unique mix of orientations, foreigners inevitably threaten to alter the domestic culture through the introduction of new orientations." 3 This understanding of what a national culture consists of transcends individual nations.
Western and eastern European nations share a similar approach to protecting their distinct national cultures. The result is that a shared view of foreigners as threatening these cultures may create transnational xenophobia.
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Hatred of the "foreign" had shaped the politics of nearly all European countries in the 1930s. Anti-Semitism was its most horrific representation. World War II was an unprecedented enactment of racist hatred and led to the slaughter of millions of European citizens who no longer were viewed as belonging to European nations. Joseph Goebbels referred to German Jews as part of world Jewry, international Jewry, and therefore not
German. The social construction of who were outsiders, then, had greater political salience than whether the place of origin of an ethnic or religious group was foreign or not. The presence of Jews was viewed as an erosion of the ethnic German community. As Göran Therborn put it, "Like all collective identities, European identity formation has faced two kinds of Others: one outside, beyond the range of the (potential) collective, the second inside, dividing the self to be made." 4 Beginning in the 1950s Europe underwent a transformative process that made a fear of foreigners-those from the outside--salient. European modernity had primarily been shaped by emigration. During the first half of the twentieth century, outmigration, primarily to North America, had helped keep European states homogeneous and had eased their social conflicts. There were some differences among these states, of course. Whereas
France was one of the few European countries that did not have sizeable out-migration,
Italy had sent wave after wave of its sons and daughters abroad. 5 Hard as it is to believe today, postwar migration into Europe--though not new--caught the European public by surprise. Therborn highlighted the unprecedented nature of this development: "The shift from emigration to immigration represents an epochal change in 4 European social history. Ethnic--and largely continental ethnic--conflict has substituted for intra-European nationalist rivalry. The socio-political effect has been to weaken class cleavages and politics in favor of ethnic and other non-class ones." 6 While they never completely disappeared in the period of postwar reconstruction, racist and xenophobic politics began to make waves--again-in the 1960s when Europe sought to consolidate its economic comeback. The most important factor stimulating xenophobic attitudes was the foreigner originating from the Third World--not "foreigner" who was a citizen of another European state. To be sure, non-Europeans had been settling on the continent for centuries. But the difference now was in the sheer numbers arriving in a short time span. Though they appeared to be able to accommodate and absorb the new arrivals in practical ways--providing jobs, housing, schools, health care--host societies appeared psychologically unprepared to adapt to large-scale in-migration. Laqueur's implication was that the new wave of migration, beginning with Turkish Gastarbeiters to Germany in the 1960s, did not have to struggle to obtain rights; they had these conferred on themselves, in large measure as the product of a German and, more generally, European sense of guilt at their earlier treatment of minority groups, the colonized, and the powerless. "So long as Europe needed both guest workers and increasing populations, there was a convincing psychological explanation for the relaxed immigration regimes of the second half of the twentieth century. A sense of guilt over Europe's colonial past and then World War II, when intolerance exploded into mass murder, allowed a large migration to occur without any uncomfortable debates over the real differences between migrant and host." Fear and dislike of foreigners may partly be the result of a perception that they are a privileged group with special rights, few obligations, and a desire to keep apart from the rest of society. Why citizens come to fear and even hate foreigners is a complex issue, however, and has been the subject of considerable research. 9 Often the fear of foreigners is less self-induced than incited by those in authority so as to serve their interests. Simply defining a group as foreign can be an insidious act inciting xenophobic attitudes towards it. Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin identified the importance of "official fear"--an 7 offshoot of the cosmic fear felt by humanity powerless in the face of nature. 10 Political elites everywhere know the power of spreading fear among their citizens.
Xenophobia is the repudiation of the notion of hospitality. Jacques Derrida theorized about the politics of hospitality offered to strangers. It was contingent in nature because it invariably involved legal and judicial systems grounded in the host society, above all, reflected in its immigration laws. These systems suspended and conditioned the immediate, infinite, and unconditional welcoming of the other. 11 As elaborated by sociologist Meyda Yegenoglu, "conditional hospitality is offered at the owner's place, home, nation, state, or city--that is, at a place where one is defined as the master and where unconditional hospitality or unconditional trespassing of the door is not possible."
Being ascribed the status of stranger frequently invites hostile reactions. As Georg Simmel contended, "a stranger is not one who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow." 12 It follows that, as Zygmunt Bauman believed, strangers are "always uninvited guests" violating the basis of the host-guest relationship. 13 
Different Fears in Different Europes?
An unstated assumption of EU enlargement has been that western Europe is morally obliged to save its eastern part from itself-its hatreds, paranoias, and squabbles. Yet a 2003 study comparing eastern and western European xenophobia concluded that if there was a higher rate in the east it was "related more to recent structural changes than to more profound understandings of how 'us/we' is conceptualized." 15 Two years later another study reported that "If one compares the state of racist extremism in Central and Eastern
Europe to that in Western Europe, the differences seem less striking than is often assumed." 16 The distinction between a supposed western "civic" xenophobia and an eastern "ethnic" one seems bogus.
To be sure, EU enlargement brought political and cultural differences between the two parts of Europe to the surface. Balibar went so far as to claim that "A veritable fracture has thus arisen, a sort of cold war after the Cold War…but one which is both plural and mobile, and which is hidden under a thick mythology about 'clashes of civilizations'
between Eastern and Western Europe, supposedly inherited from religious tradition or from the form of state building, when not simply from the ethnic character of the nations involved." 17 Balibar sketched a system of concentric circles leading from the "true"
Europe (the advanced western states) to an "outer" one asking to be Europeanized (the eastern part). seekers and Turks. It followed that marriage with a member of these groups was generally frowned upon (Table 1) . Respondents were just as adamant that asylum seekers-in practice a proxy for poor people from developing countries--should not enjoy the same rights as Germans, though they were divided over whether Turks should have these rights. Poles voiced much stronger opposition, however, to interdenominational marriages.
Respondents were somewhat more Islamophobic than anti-Semitic with 55% expressing opposition to a son or daughter's marriage with a Muslim and 47% with a Jew. Poles relented somewhat if a possible son-in-law or daughter-in-law was Christian:
Orthodoxophobic views were expressed by the 38% of respondents who would oppose a son or daughter marrying someone of this faith. Marrying a Protestant was less critically perceived (31%). Antipathy towards a possible atheist son-or daughter-in-law was at about the same level as for an Orthodox one (37%).
Someone of the same nationality and religion were two of the most important characteristics respondents looked for in a spouse, or friend, for that matter. Only the 13 factor "way of comporting oneself in public"--let's call it "having good manners"--was seen as more important than religion or nationality in a potential spouse. Educational level, occupation, and political views were less influential. Irish is explained by the fact that these are two Catholic EU countries with which Poland has sometimes made common cause on EU policy. They have also been welcoming to Polish workers looking for jobs in the west.
Poles' least preferred nationalities changed only slightly over this same period. In 1993
Romanians were the least favorite: a -57% net difference between those saying they liked and those saying they disliked them! When Roma were added to the survey the next year they immediately overtook Romanians ( 69% in 1994). Three mainly Orthodox nations--Ukrainians (-53%), Serbs (-45%) and Russians (-39%)--came next. Belorussians did not fare well either (-28%). But they were still comfortably ahead of Germans (-53%) and Jews (-36%).
By a large margin (a -57% differential), Poles' least favorite "nation" in 2006 were the Arabs, who were first included in the survey in 2002. Roma came next (-44%) followed 14 by their namesake, Romanians (-36%). Turks followed (-31%) with Jews, Russians, and
Serbs Orthodox tied at -25%. As many Poles now said they liked their EU western neighbors as said they did not care for Germans (at 33%).
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Poles' strong dislike of Arabs and Turks suggests that Poles suffer from a degree of Islamophobia, just like Germans do. To some extent Poles may be seen as
Orthodoxophobes too, though it can be argued that dislike of Russians, in particular, has little to do with religious differences and everything to do with history. Finally, even though dislike of Romanians, Roma, and Jews--the latter two groups, significantly, often perceived as homeless, nomadic nations--has been declining, Poles share the historic antipathy towards such perceived "bogeyman nations" with many of their fellow citizens in Europe. Germans are more guarded in giving their views on Jews but they are more candid in expressing antipathy towards asylum seekers and, to a lesser extent, Turksgroups that are considered non-Europeans.
Cultural Narratives of Foreigners, Fears, and Self Loathing
A particularly illuminating literary genre that captures relations between "locals" and "outsiders," and between fixed identities and those in flux as a result of migration, is theatre. The sense of belonging and the process of othering--emotional and psychological phenomena that can be made tangible on stage-are themes that especially lend themselves to theatrical representation. It is no surprise, therefore, that many European playwrights and directors have addressed these subjects. The theme of emigration was resurrected by Polish theatre director Krzysztof
Warlikowski. His production of Israeli writer Hanokh Levin's Kroum, staged during the 2005 summer theatre season in Avignon, was widely acclaimed. 23 The story concerns a man returning to his home country after a long trip abroad. Dressed in a cowboy hat and pulling a suitcase on wheels behind him, he arrives in his house in a dank quarter of TelAviv--a district that could be anywhere in Europe, or elsewhere.
Kroum is reunited with his mother but he has an admission to make. "Mama, I haven't succeeded. I haven't found fortune or happiness abroad. I haven't progressed an inch, I
didn't haven't fun, didn't marry, didn't even get engaged. I didn't meet a soul. I didn't buy anything and didn't bring anything back. There's only dirty laundry and toiletries in my 
Thematically similar to Kroum is Ariane Mnouchkine's "pageant of the uprooted"--Le
Dernier Caravansérail (Odyssées). 24 The title is meant to be ironic: a caravansérail is rooted in the Persian word which means palace, or the spacious place where caravans put up for a rest. Mnouchkine's odyssey is a testimonial to the new existential nomads who wander the world, looking for landfall which they can call home.
The six-hour saga is set in detention camps in France, Australia, New Zealand, and Russkis--a pejorative word for Russians when used by Poles--are blamed for controlling the black market in knock-off cigarettes, pirated CDs, even Polish sand--these are some of their economic wrongdoings. They have raised the salinity of the Niemen river and are responsible for the arrival of gale-force winds--their part in environmental degradation.
They also go off with grubby-faced dirty girls, demonstrating their lack of taste and culture.
There are few insults that can be hurled in Poland worse than to say your "mother takes off her panties for the Russkies." 28 By contrast, the best testimonial a Pole can receive is:
"radically anti-Russki with right-wing tendencies," which denotes "individual achievements in the advancement of Polishness.'" 29 The thinking pervading much of Polish society is, then, "Either you're Polish or you're Russki. To put it more bluntly, either you're a person or you're a prick." 30 
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In 2006 her whole life in a factory of monkeys and dogs and doesn't know how to behave in public." 33 Later he explains to a drunken middle-class Polish woman driving to Warsaw:
"we're Romanians who speak Polish, we're lesbians, queers, Jews, we work in an advertising agency, like I said you know, we're going to Israel to plant trees." 34 Whether the couple really are Romanians speaking Polish or drunken Poles playing a prank and mimicking Romanians speaking Polish is an academic question. In the first case, the two
Romanians reach for what they guess is the negative Polish stereotype of their country. In the second, the two Poles try to capture the self-loathing Romanians feel as Romanians traveling in a more "western" country. Spain, where much of Possibility of an Island is set (and Houellebecq currently lives), is still not quite old Europe, however: "Spaniards don't like cultural programs at all, nor culture in general, it's an area that is fundamentally hostile to them." 37 
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The author ridicules job seekers from eastern Europe even if the threat of the Polish plumber has no currency for him. In the brothels visited by David1, the main protagonist of Possibility of an Island, "most of the girls were Romanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian, in other words from one of those absurd countries that emerged from the implosion of the Eastern bloc." 38 The pornography industry "remained in the hands of shady Hungarian, or even Latvian, jobbers." 39 Aging tourists at a holiday club are entertained to a Miss Bikini
Contest where the main contestants are a leggy teenage girl from Budapest and "a platinum-blond Russian, very curvaceous in spite of her fourteen years, who looked a right tart" and subsequently "began stuffing her hand down her bikini bottom." 40 After inevitably losing his slutty girlfriend to younger men, Daniel1 thinks to himself how "I could spend the night with a transsexual Slovenian whore." 41 The most offensive satires of foreigners in his novels are of Muslims. One character in 45 Houellebecq has been accused of misoxenia, blasphemy, and sexism--and racism.
Invoking the most classic of stereotypes, Bruno in Elementary Particles remembers as an adolescent measuring his penis, which was only 13-14 centimeters long, at most. "It was from that moment on that I started hating Blacks." 46 Elsewhere the French author speaks about a past colonial view of blacks as "an inferior brother," which constituted "a kind of benevolent, almost humanist, racism." But "From the moment that whites began to consider Blacks as equals, it became clear that sooner or later they would consider them as superior. The notion of equality has no foundation with man." 47 Again blaming the West for encouraging jumbled ethnic hierarchies, "racial discrimination in reverse" also applied to Arabs, seen as inherently superior to Europeans. 48 The author's exposé of western Europe's xenophobia-or is it his own?--adds a rich, personal texture to the phenonomenon.
What is an emigrant to Europe-indeed, one in the first wave of Gastarbeiters coming from Turkey to Germany-to make of national fears, antipathies, and prejudices appearing on the continent? Emine Sevgi Özdamar arrived in 1965 at the age of nineteen and became fluent in German, allowing her to be a writer as well as an actress in her adopted home. Her first novel published in English was Mother Tongue. Her work "aimed 24 to capture an elaborate, multicolored snapshot of Turkish culture and migration experience" and to express "her longing for forgotten words and sounds of Turkish and Koranic Arabic." 49 Her identity is located both in the home country and the receiving society, both in the remnants of a mother tongue (Turkish) and a foreign tongue (German) which has become her native tongue. Not surprisingly, "'For Germans, I'm a Turk, for Arabs German.'" 50 The author describes herself as a story teller who narrates in German, "the language of my day-to-day experiences" and "the language of some five million Gastarbeiters." 51 In
Mother Tongue, the narrator is told to explain what she is doing in her adopted country: 1950s and 1960s before she decides to emigrate to Germany. There was a hurdle to leap in order to quality for immigration to Germany: "In order to go to Germany you had to have medical tests, give urine samples, give blood samples, show your teeth." The narrator happily reported she had received her visa: "I had good urine. My path was clear." 58 Prospective immigrants were given a "Handbook for Workers Going to Work Abroad."
There was some plain advice for women: "In Europe you don't wear headscarves. If
Turkish women wear headscarves, Europe will not love them." 59 The images of Germany were favorable. Turkish women believed that "When you get your period in Germany, you don't have to work, you get those days off." 60 Europe that they were unable to sleep." 63 The author also recounts a time sunbathing topless on one of the islands near Istanbul. A motorboat suddenly passed by and one of the men remarked about her: "Today is a fine day for looking at European goods." Politicians rarely use words to tell the truth, but writers invariably do. 65 It is to Europe's cultural intelligentsia that we must turn for an understanding of the gravity of contemporary European fears.
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